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EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY "JUDGE"
EARL SNYDER*
Perhaps one of the most difficult tasks extant is to per-
suade a basically monolithic organization - this nation's
armed forces - to accept a lawyer as an almost omniscient,
omnipotent judge in its system of military trial courts.
In fact, in over 180 years it has not been done. But it is
not surprising. Dick the Butcher (articulate follower of
monolithic-minded Jack Cade) expressed it neatly - courtesy
of Shakespeare, of course: "The first thing we do, let's kill all
the lawyers."1
This may represent the view of some of today's armed
forces' leaders of all ranks. They just do not want their
disciplinary system mucked up by, they assert, knit-picking,
perverse, wrong-headed lawyers. And particularly they do
not want a lawyer in a military court in a position analogous
to a judge in a civilian court.
But the armed forces are slowly and, more or less, grace-
fully bowing to the inevitable. Through acts of Congress
and decisions of the Court of Military Appeals (the highest
tribunal in the military court hierarchy - composed of 3
civilian judges) the law officer of a general court-martial 2
is gradually evolving into the judge of a military trial court.
It has been a fairly lengthy and rocky road to achieve
this.
THE EARLIER VIEw
For the purpose of this article the starting point may be
taken as the Articles of War enacted in 1920 (and amended
in 1937 and 1942).3 Article of War 8 provided, in part:
*A.B., LL.B., Indiana University, LL.M., Catholic University of Amer-
ica; member of the bar, Indiana; barrister-at-law, Gray's Inn, England;
judge advocate, U. S. Air Force. The views expressed in this article are
those of the author and should in no way be attributed to the Department
of the Air Force or Department of Defense.
1. King Henry VI, part 2, act IV, scene 11.
2. The other two courts in the military juridical hierarchy - a special
and a summary court-martial - are essentially lay courts.
3. Army Reorganization Act of 1920, sec. 1, ch. II, 41 Stat. 787. If
any reader wants to pursue an interesting facet of military juridical
history having to do with members of courts-martial and the role of the
38i
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The authority appointing a general court-martial shall
detail as one of the members thereof a law member who
shall be an officer of the Judge Advocate General's De-
partment, except that when an officer of that depart-
ment is not available for the purpose, the appointing-
authority shall detail instead an officer of some other
branch of the service selected by the appointing au-
thority as specifically qualified to perform the duties
of law member. The law member, in addition to his du-
ties as the President may by regulations prescribe.
(Italics supplied.)
Congress was additionally helpful in giving the law mem-
ber some quasi-judicial authority in Article of War 31. But
it also proscribed his authority with an appalling list of
matters on which he could be overturned by the lay members
of the court - the judge overruled by the jury, so to speak.
Article of War 31 said, in part:
The law member of the court . . . may rule in open
court upon interlocutory questions, other than challenge,
arising during the proceeding: ... And provided further,
That if any such ruling be made by the law member
of the court upon any interlocutory question other than
an objection to the admissibility of evidence offered dur-
ing the trial, and any member object to the ruling, the,
court shall likewise be cleared and closed and the ques-
tion decided by a majority vote, viva voce, beginning
with the junior in rank: Provided further, however, that-
the phrase 'objection to the admissibility of evidence
offered during the trial' as used in the next preceeding
proviso hereof shall not be construed to include questions
as to the order of the introduction of witnesses or other
evidence, nor of the recall of witnesses for further ex-
amination, nor as to whether expert witnesses shall be
admitted or called upon any question, nor as to whether
the court shall view the premises where an offense is
alleged to have been committed, nor as to the compe-
tency of witnesses, as, for instance, of children, witnesses
judge advocate in years past, a gambol through pages 170-204, Winthrop's
Military Law and Precedents (2nd ed., 1920 reprint) may be a rewarding
experience. There is substantial conceptual difference between the 19th,
(and early 20th) century and present roles of courts-martial members and
the judge advocate. For one thing, there apparently was no military
"judge" no law officer or law member - in those earlier times.
[Vol. 14
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alleged to be mentally incompetent, and the like, nor as
to the insanity of the accused, or whether the existence
of mental disease or mental derangement on the part of
the accused has become an issue in the trial, or accused
required to submit to physical examination, nor whether
any argument or statement of counsel for the accused
or of the trial judge advocate is improper, nor any rul-
ing in a case involving military strategy or tactics or
correct military action; but, upon all these questions
arising in the trial, if any member object to any ruling
of the law member the court shall be cleared and closed
and the question decided by majority vote of the mem-
bers in the manner aforesaid.
The law member was far from analogous to a civilian
judge! In addition, he sat physically with the other mem-
bers of the court during trial. And he deliberated and voted
- in closed session along with the other members - on the
guilt or innocence of the accused and the sentence imposed
in event of a finding of guilt.
AFTER WORLD WAR II
These Articles of War were amended again in 1948.4 Arti-
cle of War & then read, in part:
The authority appointing a general court-martial shall
detail as one of the members thereof a law member who
shall be an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Corps,
or an officer who is a member of the bar of a Federal
court or of the highest court of a state of the United
States and certified by the Judge Advocate General to
be qualified for such detail: Provided, That no general
court-martial shall receive evidence or vote upon its
findings or sentence in the absence of the law member
regularly detailed. The law member, in addition to his
duties as a member, shall perform the duties prescribed
in Article 31 hereof and such other duties as the President
may by regulations prescribe.
Moreover, definite strides were made in the direction of
constituting the law member a quasi-judge in the amendment
to Article of War 31. Many of the former restrictions on
his authority were lifted.
4. Act of June 24, 1948 (also known as The Elston Act); 62 Stat. 627.
3
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As amended in 1948 Article of War 31 read, in part:
The law member of a general court-martial . .. shall
rule in open court upon interlocutory questions, other
than challenge, arising during the proceedings: . . .
And provided further, That any such ruling made by
the law member of a general court-martial upon any
interlocutory question other than a motion for finding
of not guilty, or the question of accused's sanity, shall
be final and shall constitute the ruling of the court; ....
In addition, the law member was given the duty of advising
the other court members on the presumption of innocence,
reasonable doubt, degrees of guilt and burden of proof.
However, the law member still physically sat with the
other members of the court and, in their closed session, de-
liberated and voted on the guilt or innocence of the accused
and the sentence imposed in event of a finding of guilt.
(These two matters were not changed by the 1948 amend-
ment.)
It was not until 1951 that a decision of the newly formed
United States Court of Military Appeals5 unequivocally clari-
fied the status of the law member.
In a general court-martial convened May 4, 1951,6 (and
thus governed by the Articles of War, not the Uniform Code
of Military Justice7) the president of the general court-
martial - a mature, experienced army officer, not a lawyer -
decided several issues which should have been decided by
the law member.
He denied a motion to dismiss one of the charges against
the accused; ruled on the admissibility of a confession; denied
(at the conclusion of the government's case) another motion
5. Established under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat.
129 (1950) 10 U. S. C. 867 (1956). It came into existence May 31, 1951.
The three civilian judges are appointed for terms of fifteen years by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. They may
be appointed for successive terms.
6. U. S. v. Berry, 1 USCMA 235,2 CMR 141 (1951).
7. By Executive Order 10214, February 8, 1951, (prescribing the Man-
ual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951) the President provided, in
substance, that an act done prior to May 31, 1951, would be charged as a
violation of the Articles of War (with respect to the Army and Air
Force), not a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He also
provided that any trial begun before May 31, 1951 might be completed
in accordance with laws, executive orders and regulations of the armed
forces in effect prior to May 31, 1951.
[Vol. 14
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to dismiss one of the charges against the accused; and at
the close of the case denied a motion for a finding of not
guilty.
The Court of Military Appeals met this onslaught forth-
rightly. It reversed the conviction of the accused and re-
turned the record of trial to the Army Judge Advocate Gen-
eral so that he might either dismiss the charges or order a
rehearing.
The late Judge Brosman - writing for the court - said:
The Articles of War, as amended, and the 1949 Manual
[for Courts-Martial] make clear that the law member's
position with respect to a court-martial is closely analo-
gous to that of the judge in the criminal law adminis-
tration of the civilian community....
If the president of a general court-martial - freely
selected as he is by the convening authority, possibly
more concerned with military discipline than with law
administration, and almost certainly less well-informed
within the latter sphere under ordinary circumstances -
is able to usurp the judge-like functions of the law mem-
ber, then, we are much afraid, at least one barrier inter-
posed by Congress in the path of what has been popu-
larly characterized as 'command influence' has been
weakened, if not removed. 8
The Uniform Code of Military Justice, transforming the
law member into the law officer, and the Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States-1951 (its executive order companion)
did not become effective until May 31, 1951 with respect to
all court-martial processes taken on and after that date.
However, Judge Brosman made this case an opportunity to
indicate the court's thinking on the role of the law officer
under the new Code and Manual for Courts-Martial.
He noted that the only substantial change made by the
Code in transforming the law member into the law officer was
to prohibit the law officer's participation in the deliberation
of the court-martial on the guilt or innocence of the accused
(and the sentence to be assessed in event of the former).
He also noted that this necessarily imposed on the law officer
the duty of instructing the members of the court on the ele-
8. U. S. v. Berry, supra at 146-7.
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ments of the offense alleged and charging them as to the
presumption of innocence and similar matters.
Significantly, he stated:
The legislative background of the Uniform Code
makes clear beyond question Congress' conception of the
law officer as a judge to all material intents and pur-
poses. Professor E. M. Morgan, chairman of the Secre-
tary of Defense's committee, whose efforts resulted in
the confection and passage of the Code, stated in re-
sponse to the Congressional Committee inquiry into the
place of the law officer: 'Well, the fundamental notion
was that the law officer ought to be as near like a civilian
judge as it was possible under the circumstances.'...9
UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
In the first reported case on this subject under the new
Code (decided by an Army board of review) a tentative limit
was put on the analogy of law officer to civilian judge.'0
In this case the accused was charged with premeditated
murder and found guilty of unpremeditated murder. Before
the board of review his counsel urged that the law officer
committed prejudicial error when he failed (1) to define
technical words and words of art (2) to instruct on all essen-
tial questions of law involved and raised by the pleadings or
evidence and (3) to instruct on the elements of "lesser in-
cluded offenses" - even though he wasn't requested to
do so."1
The board of review said that"... although the law offi-
cer's function is rather closely analogous to that of a civilian
judge, the two are not coextensive."
It pointed out that the Uniform Code of Military Justice
required only that the law officer instruct the court on the
elements of the offense charged, presumption of innocence
and burden of proof. He may give additional instructions,
but he is not required to do S0.12
9. Ibid.
10. CM 349601, Baguex, 2 CMR 424 (1952). A board of review is an
armed force intermediate appellate tribunal composed of three lawyers,
military or civilian, or both. One may petition to appeal from its decision
to the Court of Military Appeals. (Under certain circumstances appeal is
is automatic.)
11. Id. at 433.
12. Id. at 434.
[Vol. 14
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With this relatively minor deviation from the straight and
narrow, boards of review and the Court of Military Ap-
peals settled down to what is apparently an almost unbroken
line of decisions analogizing the law officer to a judge of a
civilian criminal court.
These appellate tribunals have done this explicitly in many
cases: they have simply stated (and decided) that the au-
thority and responsibility of the law officer is analogous to
that of a civilian judge.
13
In other cases, they have done it implicitly in one of two
ways: they have held the law officer to a standard of con-
duct (with regard to the trial in which he is sitting) similar
to that to which a civilian judge is held in a trial in which
he is sitting; or they have decided he has authority to make
certain decisions during the trial which a civilian judge has
traditionally made.14
These cases are bottomed on two articles of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice which provide for appointment of
a law officer on a general court-martial and prescribe his
duties.' 5
13. See, e.g., ACM 4221, Patrick, 3 CMR 555 (1952) ; U. S. v. Knudson,
4 USCMA 587, 16 CMR 161 (1954); and U. S. v. Duncan 9 USCMA 465,
26 CMI 245 (1958).
14. On the first point, see, e.g., ACM 6695, Gemelli, 11 CMR 690 (1953)
(law officer previously acted as staff judge advocate and recommended
the case be referred for trial to a general court-martial); CM 393003
Neal, 23 CMR 463 (1956) (law officer took too active a role in question-
ing witnesses, etc.); CM 398518, Bennamon, 25 CMR 609 (1958) (law
officer went beyond impartiality in cross-examination of accused); U. S.
v. Solak, 10 USCMA 440, 28 CMR 6 (1959) (unauthorized communica-
tion between law officer and court); and U. S. v. Boysen, 11 USCMA
331, 29 CMR 147 (1960) (substitution of one law officer by another
during course of trial).
On the second point, see, e.g., CM 350647 Borner, 8 CMR 483 (1952),
affd, U. S. v. Borner, 3 USCMA 306, 12 CMR 62 (1953) (view of scene
of offense within discretion of law officer); U. S. v. Jackson, 3 USCMA
646, 14 CMR 64 (1954) (law officer must direct trial along path of
recognized procedure in way reasonably calculated to bring end to trial
without prejudice to either party); ACM 7761, Schreiber, 16 CMR 639
(1954), affd, U. S. v. Schreiber, 5 USCMA 602, 18 CMR 226 (1955) (law
officer had authority to grant change in place of trial); and CI 399282,
Cannon, 26 CMR 593 (1958) (law officer responsible for professional de-
corum of trial and defense counsel).
15. Article 26 says:
"(a) The authority convening a general court-martial shall appoint
as law officer thereof an officer who is a member of the, bar of a Federal
court or the highesf court of a State of the United States and who is
certified to be qualified for such duty by the Judge Advocate General
of the armed force of which he is a member. No person shall be eligible
to act as law officer in a case when he is the accuser or a witness for
the prosecution or has acted as investigating officer or as counsel in the
same case.
7
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SOME EXAMPLES
In a case decided not long after the effective date of the
Code, an Air Force board of review had an opportunity to
enunciate its view on the status of the law officer.16
An Air Force captain was convicted of conspiring to de-
fraud the United States through presentation of a false
and fraudulent claim. Prior to trial the staff judge advocate
to the convening authority of the general court-martial fur-
nished the law officer with a "Memorandum of Legal Au-
thorities." This memorandum contained what the staff judge
advocate believed to be authoritative decisions on questions
of law he thought might arise during the court-martial.
On appellate review defense counsel argued that the staff
judge advocate's furnishing this memorandum to the law of-
ficer prejudiced substantial rights of the accused since it -
in effect - influenced the law officer in accordance with
the views of the staff judge advocate.
In holding that there was no prejudice, the board of re-
view said:
It is important to note that the law officer of a gen-
eral court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951, occu-
pies a status analogous to that of a civilian judge .... 17
The board quoted testimony of a member of the drafting
committee of the Uniform Code of Military Justice before
the Senate subcommittee considering passage of the code:
" ' . . . [T]his official [the law officer] will now act solely
as a judge and not as a member of the court, which becomes
much like a civilian jury.... "18
"(b) The law officer shall not consult with members of the court,
other than on the forms of the findings as provided in article 39, except
in the presence of the accused, trial counsel, and defense counsel, nor shall
he vote with the members of the court."
Article 51 says in part:
"(b) The law officer of a general court-martial . . . shall rule upon
interlocutory questions, other than challenge, arising during the pro-
ceedings. Any such ruling made by the law officer of a general court-
martial upon any interlocutory question other than a motion for a find-
ing of not guilty, or the question of accused's sanity, shall be final and
shall constitute the ruling of the court .... "
It also requires the law officer to instruct the court on the elements
of the offense or offenses with which the accused is charged, presumption
of innocence, reasonable doubt, degrees of guilt and burden of proof.
16. ACM 4221, Patrick, 3 CMR 555 (1952).
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Soon after, the Court of Military Appeals was afforded an
opportunity to take another look at its holding in U. S. v.
Berry, supra.
In an Army general court-martial in which the accused
was convicted of larceny and housebreaking, the law officer
- on request of members of the court - explained certain.
aspects of the difference between a bad conduct and a dis-
honorable discharge.' 9 He did this out of the presence of
trial and defense counsel and accused. Explaining the dif-
ference out of the presence of the defense counsel and ac-
cused is in direct contravention of Article 26, Uniform Code
of Military Justice.
20
However, the law officer appended to the record of the
trial a verbatim record of his explanation.
In arguing this case before the Court of Military Appeals,
government counsel urged that scrutiny of the verbatim record
disclosed that the law officer's explanation did not prejudice
any substantial right of the accused.
In holding that this argument could not be sustained in
the context of this case, the court said that it was Congress'
intent to " . . . insure, as far as legislatively possible, that
the law officer perform in the image of a civilian judge. This
policy•., must be strictly enforced .... "21
The court significantly added that the civilian cases relied
on by government counsel did not arise
... at a time or in a system wherein the legislature had
recently made an effort to implement basic policies by
completely overhauling court procedures and official
functions. There is, in the civilian courts, a tradition
of centuries standing that judges do not confer privately
with juries. In military law, as recently as one year
ago, the officers who now serve as law officers were
not only allowed but also required as law members to.
* confer privately with the court ... .22
OUTSIDE INFLUENCE
Another interesting law officer-as-judge area is that in,
which some person (acting in an official capacity) attempts
to influence the decision of the law officer.
19. U. S. v. Keith, 1 USCMA 493,4 CMR 85 (1952).
20. Supra, note 15.
21. TT. S. v. Keith, supra, note 19 at 88.
22. Aid.
9
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This person may be the convening authority of the general
court-martial (usually acting through his staff judge ad-
vocate) the staff judge advocate himself (acting in that
capacity) or the president of the general court-martial (fre-
quently, perhaps usually, an officer senior in rank to the
law officer).23
An illuminating example occurred in a Navy general court-
martial.24 The accused was charged with sodomy and sent
for trial before a general court-martial. On the date of trial,
defense counsel requested the law officer to grant a continu-
ance even though he conceded he was prepared to proceed on
Athe merits.
H [e requested the continuance, he asserted, because accused
-had been previously tried before a judge and jury of a su-
perior court of California for the same offense and acquitted.
Accused then had prepared a letter (referring to his ac-
quittal by the California court and Navy policy against sec-
ond trial by court-martial for the same offense) and had
forwarded it to the Secretary of the Navy, prior to the date
,of this court-martial.
There had been no reply to this letter - indeed, it ap-
-peared it had not had time to reach the addressee.
On the basis of these facts the law officer granted a con-
-tinuance sine die.
By letter, dated two days after the continuance was granted,
the Commandant of the 11th Naval District " . . . directed
![the law officer], unless there is reasonable cause for con-
tinuance, to resume the trial.., as soon as practicable."
Three days after the date of the letter, the law officer
resumed trial. Accused was convicted of sodomy and sen-
tenced to a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances and confinement at hard labor for I year.
25
The Court of Appeals - Chief Judge Quinn writing on
its behalf - reversed the conviction and ordered a rehearing.
The court first held that granting a continuance rested
-within the sound discretion of the law officer. Then it un-
23. See e.g., U. S. v. Guest, 3 USCMA 147, 11 CMR 147 (1953) (both
ataff judge advocate and president); U. S. v. Knudson, 4 USCMA 581,
16 CMR 161 (1954) (convening authority); ACM 10994, Robinson 20 CIVR
816 (1950) (convening authority); CM 398680, Godwin 25 CMR 600
(1958) (both staff judge advocate and president).
24. U. S. v. Knudson, supra, note 23.
25. Id. at 163-4.
390 [Vol. 14
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equivocally stated its view on the convening authority's
action:
Having no power to review the law officer's grant of
a continuance, the convening authority should not inject
himself into the proceedings. However honest may be his
belief that he possesses the power, he cannot substitute
his judgment for that of the law officer....
The record clearly shows that the law officer yielded
to the pressure of the convening authority. . . . In so
doing, he abdicated his powers to the convening authority.
Manifestly this was error .... 2
When the Court of Military Appeals pointed the way,2T
boards of review in the Air Force 8 and Army29 took oppor-
tunities to follow.
JUDICIAL STANDARDS AND AUTHORITY
Lack of space prevents more than one example each of the
requirement that a law officer (1) abide by the standards of
trial behavior of a civilian judge and (2) have authority
during trial analogous to that of a civilian judge.
In a 1956 Army general court-martial30 the accused was
charged with larceny, failure to account for public funds, and
absence without leave.
26. Id. at 165-6.
27. It had done so, as well, in U. S. v. Guest, supra, note 23.
28. ACM 10994, Robinson, supra, note 23. In this case defense counsel
requested trial counsel to make a charge more specific. The law officer
indicated this should be done. Trial counsel procured a recess and con-
tacted the convening authority (actually, undoubtedly, the staff judge
advocate to the convening authority - but the reported decision does not
say as much) who stated he desired the court to proceed on the charge
as it was drawn. After the recess, trial counsel reported this. The law
officer denied defense counsel's request - specifically stating that his
ruling was based on the communication of the convening authority.
29. CM 398680, Godwin, supra, note 23. In this case the law officer
ruled that a statement was inadmissible. The convening authority's staff
judge advocate was present as a spectator in the courtroom. Immediately
after this ruling he left the room angrily. The law officer granted trial
counsel a continuance to obtain other evidence. When the court recessed,
the law officer (a captain) was asked by the president of the general
court-martial (a colonel) to convey an undisclosed message to the staff
judge advocate (a colonel). When the law officer reported to the staff
judge advocate, the latter asked questions concerning testimony leading
up to the law officer's ruling and possibly indicated by implication an
opinion concerning it. The law officer also discussed his ruling with the
chief of the military justice section of this staff judge advocate's office. A
week later another out-of-court hearing was held on the question and
the law officer reversed his previous ruling on admissibility of the
statement. The accused was convicted. On appellate review the board
of review reversed accused's conviction and ordered the charges dis-
missed.
30. CM 393003, Neal, 23 CMR 463 (1956).
11
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The trial counsel had difficulty in introducing various doc-
uments in evidence. The law officer "took over" and actively
assisted in this. He also took over examination of a witness,
over defense objection, and developed considerable evidence
the trial counsel did not bring out. With still another witness
the law officer laid a foundation for introduction of docu-
mentary evidence. He also questioned a fourth witness at
length on matters not previously in evidence.
In overturning conviction of the accused and ordering a
rehearing, the Army board of review said:
The law officer is a judge and his active participation
in the trial of the case in another capacity constitutes
error ( citing cases) ....
Congress, in enacting the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, clearly intended that military personnel charged
with serious offenses would be tried by a 'judge' and
'jury' .... 31
An interesting example of authority accorded a law officer,
long accorded a civilian judge (and regarded as fundamental),
is illustrated in an Army general court-martial.
32
Borner and others were convicted of felony murder and
rape while stationed in Korea. Defense counsel requested
that the court members be permitted to view the alleged scene
of the offenses. The law officer denied this motion.
Both the Army board of review and the Court of Military
Appeals held that granting a view of the scene of an alleged
offense lies within the "sound discretion of the law officer."33
However, there is a caveat here as the law is presently con-
stituted: under certain circumstances the law officer's author-
ity has been held to be subject to the ultimate authority of
the convening authority.
For example, granting or denying relief similar to that
provided by a change of venue in a civilian court has been
held to be " . . . within the discretion of the law officer in
the first instance and thereafter within the discretion of
the convening authority .... ,,34
31. Id. at 465-6.
32. CAT 350647, Borner, 8 CMR 483 (1952), aff'd, U. S. v. Borner,
3 USCMA 306, 12 CAIR 62 (1953).
33. 8 CMR at 493: 12 CMR at 66.
34. ACD1 7761, Schreiber, supra, note 14.
[Vol. 14
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A FINAL AREA
There is one additional area with regard to the law officer
in which the Court of Military Appeals has found it necessary
to speak forthrightly.
It would be almost unthinkable for the situation to occur
in a civilian criminal trial. Yet, because a general court-
martial is composed of officers vitally concerned daily (in
most instances) with a disciplinary system and because in
years past these officers have been both judge and jury, chaos
occasionally results.
Infrequently, higher ranking court members attempt to
transform themselves into lawyers. They become partisan
advocates and endlessly ask questions of witnesses. In the
process they almost invariably commit prejudicial errors and
extend a court-martial to unusual lengths.
Because the general court-martial is composed of officers
vitally concerned with a disciplinary system - and because
in past years other officers have traditionally been both
judge and jury - and because some members of the general
court-martial are frequently older and higher ranking than
the law officer - and because sometimes the law officer is not
only relatively young and lower ranking but also not par-
ticularly able or experienced - because of all these factors,
the law officer seems either unable or unwilling to control
the activities and questions of the court members.
The problem is amply illustrated by an Air Force general
court-martial. 35
In this case, one member of the court-martial examined
or cross-examined every witness. He elicited testimony "fa-
vorable to the prosecution and cast doubt on the credibility
of witnesses who sought to aid the accused. '3 6 This resulted
in other members of the court-martial doing likewise.
The situation was characterized by one judge of the Court
of Military Appeals:
... The pattern of the trial literally followed the rule
of mass participation.... I doubt that I've ever reviewed
a record in which court members sought so diligently
35. U. S. v. Blankenship, 7 USCMA 328, 22 CMR 118 (1956), revers-
ing ACM 11221, Blankenship, 20 CMR 881 (1955).
36. Id. at 125.
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to assist counsel in the presentation of their case ...
One can readily appreciate that a trial gets out of control
when some members of a court consider that they are
pseudo-lawyers and then are permitted to practice their
art from the fact-finder's bench. .... 37
This judge - Judge Latimer - felt it necessary to write
a separate concurring opinion (the majority opinion reversed
the case on account of this activity) to make clear to law
officers that they had a responsibility to control this sort
of behavior; and to suggest specific ways of doing it.38
The Court of Military Appeals left no doubt in the minds
of law officers and potential general court-martial members
of all armed forces that the law officer must function as a
judge regardless of relative rank.
CONCLUSION
While it is apparent that the military "judge" has pro-
gressed rather rapidly along the road to becoming a judge
in the civilian juridical sense, it is also apparent that it will
take further decisions by armed forces' boards of review and
the Court of Military Appeals before a really adequate posi-
tion is reached.
Part of the difficulty, as I have said above, appears to lie
in the fact that some armed forces' judge advocates who are
appointed law officers lack age, maturity, experience and
perhaps - sad to relate - ability and judicial temperament.
Thus, it is difficult to force a judge-like pattern on older,
more mature, higher-ranking court members, some of whom
may remember when they were both judge and jury - or at
least have heard tales of it.
Patience and persistence - an excellent prescription for
many difficult situations - will probably be the handmaidens
of an ultimately successful solution.
37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 126.
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